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ceedingsandtheliquidationof theirassetsin theeventof adefault.Whatmotiva-
tion,then,doesa sovereigndebtorhaveto repayitsdebt? Furthermore,whydo
bankslendtosovereigndebtorsinthefirstplace?
EatonandGersovitz(1981)suggestthatinternationalborrowingisarepeated
gamein whichdefaultimposesa costin termsof futureaccessto capitalmarkets.
*The authoris aff1liatedwith PennsylvaniaUniversity,USA. Researchsupportfrom the
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Oncea countrydefaultsit will neverbeableto borrowfromabroadagain.Given
theprospectof no futurecapitalinflows,especiallywhenfuturelevelsofconsump-
tion areuncertain,thedebtormaysufferaconsiderablelossif it defaults.If this
















tion of a tradeembargo,.lossof tradecredits,seizureof assetsheldabroad,etc.
Undersuchan implicitcontract,lendingwill takeplaceto thepointwherethe
borrowerbecomesindifferentbetweenrepayinganddefaulting(therebybearingthe
costsofthepenalties).Henceacreditceilingexistsforsovereigndebtors.










Thispaperaddressesissuesof debtreliefin amodelof aneconomywithan
externaldebtoverhang.Variousformsof debtreliefarediscussed,aswell asthe
conditionsnecessaryfor eachformof reliefto beoptimalfromthecreditor'spoint
of view. Theremainderof thispaperis organizedasfollows:in SectionTwothe
conceptof adebtoverhangaswellassomerecentworkinthisliteratureisdiscussed.






stock. Muchattentionhasbeendevotedto thepolicyimplicationsof adebtover-
hang.TheBakerPlan,whichsoughtosolvethedebtcrisis,arguedthatthereexist
amplegrowthpossibilitiesin thedebtorcountries,andthattheseopportunitieswere




creditorsbetteroff. He arguesthatthedebtburdenof somecountriesmaybeso
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In thistwo-periodmodel,thedebtorcountryhastotalresourcesQ in period
zero. It choosestoinvestpartofits resourcesforproduction,andconsumestherest.
In periodonetheproceedsof theinvestmentarerealizedaccordingto theconcave
productionfunctionmappedout by thepointsQAG. Additionally,thecountry
owesa foreigndebtD, whichmustbe repaidin periodone. It is assumedthat
creditorshaveaccesstoa "gunboat"technology- theycanextractall resourcesin
the debtorcountryabovea minimumlevelc!. Thus,thedebtor'sconsumption
possibilitiescurveis thelinewhichconnectsthepointsQACE. Thecountry'sinter-
temporalutility functioncanberepresentedby thecurveuu,whichistangento
QACE atpointA. ThecountryinvestsverylittleGustenoughto producec-!),and
endsupnotrepayinganyof itsdebt. If, ontheotherhand,creditorsforgiveX of
thedebt,thedebtorconsumptionpossibilitiespathbecomesQAHBF,andit chooses
tobeatpointB. Nowthecreditorsarerepaid(D- X), sotheyarebetteroff.More
investmenttakesplace,andpreviouslyunusedinvestmentopportunitiesareavailed.
Thedebtorisaswelloffasbeforetheforgiveness.
Oneimportantdrawbackof thismodel,however,is thatif suchavoluntary












risesby lessthantheincreasein theirfacevalue.Mter a levelD, anyincreasein
thefacevalueof claimsactuallyreducestheactualvalueof totalclaims.(Actual
value,of course,is justtheexpectedpresentdiscountedvalueof futurerepayments
to thecreditors.)Thisisdue,again,to theseveredisincentiveforinvestmentassociat-
















lending? This paperseeksto addressthis issue. The centralargumentis that in a
debtoverhangunilateraldebt forgivenessaswellasliquidityreliefis in thecreditor's
interestif certainconditionshold. This resultis different from that of Corden
(1988), Froot (1988),and Krugman(1988) in the sensethat it doesnot involve
forgivenessof future repaymentsin orderto reduceinvestmentdisincentives.This
debt relief, instead,involvesa reductionof currentdebtrepaymentso that invest-
ment in the debtorcountryincreasesand investmentopportunitiesareutilized. If
the conditionsfor suchforms of debtforgivenessarenot satisfiedthen debtrelief





debtoris endowedwith autility function
UD(xfJ, xfJ) =In (xfJ)+rP In (xD),O! 0 ! (1)
wherexI? is the debtor'sconsumptionin periodi, andrP is the debtor'sintertem-I
poraldiscountfactor. The creditorseeksto maximizethe presentdiscountedvalue
of itsconsumption.Thecreditor'sutility, then,is simply
3 Claessens(1988)is oneof thefirstsuchworks.
j
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uC (xC,xC) =xC +(3CxC,









Q =(Q -xD -xc )a1 0 0 0' (4)
wherea is someconstant.Any outputthatis not consumedby,eitheragentis
automaticallyinvested,andyieldsoutputin periodone. A repaymentD , from0
the debtorto thecreditor,is duein periodzero,anda repaymentD is duein1
periodone. If thedebtordefaultsandfailsto maketherepaymentD. in periodi,I
thecreditorexercisesapenaltyandmayseizeupto Xof thedebtor'soutputinthat
period. Thus,if D. is greaterthanXQ.,thedebtorprefersdefaulto repayment.I I
Weassumethatadebtoverhangexists,andsoD isgreaterthanXQ . Additionally,0 0
weassumethatD is sufficientlylargeto ensurethatdefaultwill bethepreferred1
strategyof thedebtorin periodone. Thus,thedebtorwill consume(1 - X)O in
.1
periodone,andXQ will beextractedby thecreditor.1
Theoptimizationproblemoft~edebtorcannowbewrittenas
maxIn (xD)+rfJ In{(1- X)(Q - xD - xc)a],




maxxC+(3CX(Q- xD - xc)a
xC< XQ
0 0 0 o'
0 - 0
(6)
SupposebothagentschoosexD andxC simultaneously,takingtheother'sactionas0 0
given.Thereactioncurveof thedebtorcanthenbewrittenas










Q - xD - (a(3CX)a::I
0 0
XQ0 otherwise.














a(3D(a(3c X)a-l 0 a(3D(1 - X)(a(3c X)a::I
(10)























(I -- A) Q.
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Q. -- (/3c ACi)a::T
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(1 -- 1I.)Q. - (lJc ACi)a=-r















Withoutdefaultrisk, efficientlendingrequiresthe marginalproductof capitalto
equalthe world interestrate. In the presenceof defaultrisk anda debtoverhang,
efficient lending from the creditor'spoint of view equatesthe marginalproduct
of capital with the world interestrate dividedby A, the lender'sshareof the
borrower'soutput. This canalsobeseenby rewritingthecreditor'sutility function,
Equation2, as
uC (xC,xC) = xC +{3CAQ (1).
0 1 0 1
(16)
Differentiatingthiswith respecto xC, wegetthe firstordercondition0
aI




This is exactlythe sameasEquation15. Condition17,then,is satisfiedin thefirst
two cases. In the third case,however,the marginalproductof investmentis less
(1 +T)





low, the creditorwill voluntarilyprovidedebtandliquidity relief(CaseOne)or debt
relief(CaseTwo), eventhoughthe debtoris in default. In eitherevent,thelevelof
investmentin the debtor country will be efficient. If, however,currentdebtor
incomeis sufficientlyhigh,thecreditorwill extractasmuchasit canandthelevelof
investmentwill beinefficient.
Any debtbuybackor exitbondschemewhichseeksto improvethewelfareof
both agentsby capturingefficiencygainsthatmayarisefrom achangein otherwise
inefficientlevelsof investmentcanbe successfulonly if CaseThreeholds.The intui-
tion as to whethersuchschemescould be Pareto-improvingis actuallyquite the
oppositeof whatis implicit in initiativeslike theBakerPlan. Insteadof capitalizing
on availableinvestmentopportunities,thesebuybacksor exit bondswould seekto
bringinvestmentin debtor countriesto more efficientlevelsby actuallyreducing
theamountof resourcesthatisinvested.
In CasesOne and Two, unilateraldebt forgivenessby the creditoris Pareto-
improving. This forgiveness,however,improveswelfarefor a verydifferentreason
thanthatdiscussedby Corden(1988),Froot (I988), andKrugman(1988). Instead
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of reducingfuture repaymentsin an effort to reduceinvestmentdisincentivesand
therebyincreaseinvestment,the debtrelief in this modeldirectlyincreasesinvest-
ment by reducingcurrent repayments. If the conditionsfor such relief arenot
satisfied(CaseThree), then other forms of debt relief may improvewelfareby
reducinginvestment.Unlike Froot (1988),thismodelshowsthatdebtreliefschemes
like buybacksand exit bonds can be Pareto-improvingwhenunilateralforgiveness
is not.
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